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Case No.: 980347-CA 
BRIEF OF PETITIONER 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to this Court's Order, 
dated July 30, 1998, allowing the interlocutory appeal. Rule 5, Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE PRESENTED 
Whether the trial court erred in its determination that there was a 
substantial change of circumstances allowing Defendant to relitigate a stipulated 
property settlement, based on allegations of fraud, that Defendant was aware of 
prior to the signing and entry of the parties' stipulation [R. 97]. 
Whether the movant established a substantial change in circumstances is a 
question of law, which is reviewed for correctness, affording no deference to the 
trial court. Smith v. Smith, 793 P.2d 407 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE 
Petitioner, Jeroldene Bayles, now known as Jeroldene Bailey, (hereinafter 
"Jeroldene") was granted a divorce from the Defendant, Randee Bayles 
(hereinafter "Randee"). The divorce was based on the parties' stipulation which 
was incorporated into the final judgment. 
Approximately four months after the final judgment was entered, Jeroldene 
filed a Motion for an Order to Show Cause in an attempt to enforce the stipulated 
property settlement. Randee responded by filing a Petition for Modification 
wherein he alleged that Jeroldene had secreted marital assets and that the 
settlement should be offset by that amount. Jeroldene then filed a Motion to 
Dismiss Defendant's Petition for Modification. 
This appeal is from the trial court's Order, dated June 16, 1998, denying 
Petitioner's Motion to Dismiss Defendant's Petition for Modification. The trial 
court was the Seventh Judicial District Court, in and for San Juan County, State of 
Utah, the Honorable Lyle R. Anderson presiding. 
B. COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
1. On January 27,1997, a Verified Divorce Complaint and Motion for 
Order to Show Cause were filed. 
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2. On February 3,1997, an Answer and Verified Counterclaim, Motion for 
Order to Show Cause and Affidavit in Support of Order to Show Cause were filed. 
3. On February 6,1997, a hearing on the reciprocal show-cause motions 
was held. 
4. On February 13,1998, an Order Re: Reciprocal Orders to Show Cause 
was filed. 
5. On April 4,1997, Plaintiffs counsel, Rosalie Reilly, filed a Notice of 
Withdrawal. 
6. On May 2, 1997, a Motion to Bifurcate was filed.1 
7. On May 7, 1997, a Motion in Re: Contempt and Affidavit of Plaintiff were 
filed. 
8. On May 9,1997, a Motion in Re: Contempt and Affidavit in Support of 
Motion Re: Contempt were filed. 
9. On May 13,1997, a hearing was held and a Decree of Divorce was 
entered. 
10. On June 13, 1997, the parties' Stipulation was filed. 
11. On June 17, 1997, the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law as 
well as an Order In Re: Divorce Settlement were entered. 
12. On September 29,1997, Defendant's counsel filed a Notice of 
Douglas Terry, Esq. entered his first appearance on behalf of Jerodlene by way 
of the Motion to Bifurcate. 
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Withdrawal. 
13. On October 24, 1997, Plaintiff's counsel, Rosalie Reilly, filed a Motion 
for Order to Show Cause and Affidavit in Support of Motion. 
14. On October 29, 1997, Plaintiff's counsel, Douglas Terry, filed a Notice 
of Withdrawal. 
15. On November 19, 1997, a Petition for Modification, Affidavit of Craig 
C. Halls, Motion for Order to Show Cause and Affidavit of Defendant were filed. 
16. On November 20, 1997, a hearing was held on the Order to Show 
Cause at which time some issues were addressed and the hearing was continued 
until December 23,1997 to address the remaining issues. 
17. On December 11,1997, a Motion to Dismiss Defendant's Petition for 
Modification was filed. 
18. On January 2, 1998, a Response to Plaintiff Motion to Dismiss 
Defendant's Petition for Modification was filed. 
19. On February 9, 1998, a Notice to Submit was filed. 
20. On February 11,1998, a Ruling on the Motion to Dismiss was filed. 
21. On June 16,1998, an Order Denying Plaintiff's Motion to Dismiss was 
entered. 
22. On June 30, 1998, a Notice of Filing Petition for Permission to Appeal 
Interlocutory Order was filed. 
23. On July 30, 1998, an Order granting the Petition for Permission for 
4 
Interlocutory Appeal was entered. 
C. DISPOSITION IN THE COURT BELOW 
The proceedings are stayed pending the outcome of this appeal. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The Divorce Complaint in this action was filed on January 27, 1997 and 
Jeroldene's Motion to Bifurcate was filed on May 2, 1997 [R. 1, 24 ] Prior to the 
hearing on the Motion to Bifurcate, Randee's counsel sent a letter to Jeroldene's 
counsel, dated May 7,1997, which, among other things, set forth the allegation 
that Jeroldene had secreted marital assets: 
I would like to convey my client's concern with regard to 
the Bayles Exploration accounts . . . It seem [sic] that 
Randee paid thousands of dollars into the personal 
account and Jeroldene made approximately $20,000, all 
of the personal debts of the parties were paid out of the 
Bayles Exploration account, including in early 1997, 
double utility payments and double car payments. The 
upshot of this is that the corporation has been drained of 
assets, which we believe should be accounted for and 
adjustment made in the settlement. 
[R. 105]. 
The letter also made mention that while Randee did not have "all of the 
necessary information with regard to the necessary adjustments . . . some of the 
noteworthy items are" three thousand dollars ($3000.00) from the home safe; 
double car and utility payments; seven hundred fifty dollars ($750.00) worth of 
frozen beef; telephone charges for the months of February, March and April; 
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credit card purchases made on business funds, tax preparation costs; and liability 
on 1996 corporate taxes [R. 105 ]. Finally, the letter also addressed the business 
records, noting that discovery was being drafted and may be filed lo force the 
return of those records to Randee [R. 105]. 
On June 13, 1997, a Stipulation, signed by ail of the'parties2, was filed and 
the same was entered on June 17, 1997 [R. 41 ]. In fl 17 of the Stipulation, 
Randee expressly waived issues raised and listed in the May 7, 1997-letter. 
Defendant waives any claims against Plaintiff with 
respect to those items listed in Defendant's attorney's 
letter dated May 7, 1997, to wit: 
(a) Three Thousand Dollars ($3000) cash kept in 
safe in the home safe, 
(b) Double payments on the car; 
(c) Double utility payments; 
(d) Frozen beef worth approximately $750; 
(e) Telephone charges for February, March and 
April, charged to Randee's card; 
(f) Credit card charges involving personal items 
which were paid from business funds; 
(g) Cost of preparation of tax return; 
(h) Liability for corporate taxes for 1996 
[R. 45] 
The parties' Stipulation was incorporated in the Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law as well as the Order in Re: Divorce Settlement, both of which 
2Jeroldene signed the Stipulation on May 30, 1997 and her attorney signed on 
May 28, 1997 Randee signed the Stipulation on May 10, 1997 and his attorney signed 
on June 9, 1997 [R 47] The Findings and the Order that followed were approved as to 
form and content, with changes, by Randee's attorney [R 55, 62] 
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were signed by the trial court and entered on June 17,1998. 
On October 24,1998, Jeroldene filed a Motion for Order to Show Cause to 
enforce the property settlement [R. 64]. On November 19, 1997, Randee filed a 
Petition for Modification3 in which he sought to, in effect, reopen the trial based on 
allegations of misconduct prior to, and during the divorce proceedings. [R. 76]. 
Randee alleged that Geraldine failed to respond to his formal and informal 
discovery requests regarding the parties' personal and financial records in 
addition to Randee's alleged recent reconstruction of his financial records4 which 
allegedly showed that Jeroldene took seventeen thousand dollars ($17,000.00) 
out of the parties' business [R. 89 ]. In his affidavit, Randee alleged that 
Jeroldene secreted money from the business in the months preceding the filing of 
the divorce complaint [R. 91]. In addition, Randee also complained of the 
property specifically waived in U 17 of the Stipulation (three thousand dollars 
($3000) from the home safe, charges on the phone card and credit card, the cost 
for preparation of the tax returns)[R. 92, 90, 90]. 
On December 11,1997, Jeroldene filed a Motion to Dismiss Defendant's 
3Randee also filed a reciprocal Motion for Order to Show Cause which requested 
some of the same relief prayed for in Defendant's Petition for Modification. 
"Although Randee claims that he was unable to reconstruct his financial records, 
it is significant to note that on July 22, 1997, during the interlocutory period and after 
the judgment had been entered, Randee subpoenaed Jeroldene's banking records. No 
further action, however, was taken until September 9, 1997, at which time, counsel for 
Randee withdrew. 
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Petition for Modification to which Randee objected [R. 97, 117]. The matter was 
submitted on February 9, 1998 [R. 127]. On February 11, 1998, the trial court 
issued a written ruling denying the Motion to Dismiss and the Order was entered 
on June 16th, 1998 [R. 129, 132]. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Randee failed to show that there had been a substantial change in 
circumstances since the entry of the judgment. Randee was aware of the 
circumstances prior to the entry of the judgment. That he allegedly has more 
details than he did prior to the entry of the judgment does not constitute a change 
in circumstances, let alone a substantial change in circumstances. 
Likewise, Randee's allegations about Jeroldene are not compelling and do 
not justify the relitigation of the case. Assuming arguendo, the allegations 
against Petitioner are true, Randee was, at the least, on notice of the alleged 
misconduct and failed to diligently pursue his remedies. His actions should be 
construed as a waiver of those issues and he should be barred from reopening 
the case on the grounds of res judicata. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT 1: NO SUBSTANTIAL CHANGE IN CIRCUMSTANCES 
EXISTS JUSTIFYING A MODIFICATION. 
It is well established that a property settlement may be modified if the 
movant demonstrates that there exists a substantial change in circumstances 
since the time of the divorce. This is codified in Utah Code §30-3-5: 
On a petition for modification of a divorce decree, the 
threshold requirement for relief is a showing of 
substantial change in the circumstances of the parties 
occurring since the entry of the divorce and not 
contemplated in the divorce itself. 
Various cases have addressed the burden for this showing, and have 
consistently held that the showing is particularly high. See generally, Land v. 
Land, 605 P.2d 1248 (Utah 1980); Adams v. Adams, 593 P2.d. 147 (Utah 1979). 
That there should be a particularly high burden is embodied in the following: 
Under Utah Law, a trial court sitting in a divorce matter 
retains continuing jurisdiction to make such 
modifications in the initial decree of divorce as it deems 
just and equitable. Where no appeal is taken from the 
original divorce decree, however, a change of 
circumstances must be shown in order to justify a later 
modification of such decree. Absent such a 
requirement, a decree of divorce would be subject to ad 
infinitum appellate review and readjustment according to 
the concepts of equity held by succeeding trial judges. 
Fouler v Fouler, 626 P.2d 412, 414 (Utah 1981). 
In the case at hand, Randee claims that the issues that he raised, but never 
fully explored and/or pursued, are a sufficient showing of a change of 
circumstances. The trial court agreed, however, the reasoning was problematic: 
"[Ijogically it would seem that a difference between reality and apparent reality 
does not constitute a change in circumstances, only a change in perception", but 
the trial court then went on to add that if the difference between reality and 
apparent reality was a change in perception, Randee would be bound to stringent 
deadlines or a separate action. That Randee would be bound to stringent 
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deadlines or a separate action adds nothing to the analysis of whether Randee 
showed a substantial change of circumstances. Indeed, the trial court, in its 
statement, implicitly acknowledges that there was not really a change in 
circumstances, but then decides, presumably under equitable principles, that 
Randee should, nevertheless, go forward. 
Assuming that Randee's allegations were true, his claims could have only 
been brought appropriately under a Rule 60(b) motion. Rule 60(b) of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure provides, in relevant part, that: 
On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court 
may in the furtherance of justice relieve a party...from a 
final judgment...for...(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, 
or excusable neglect, (2) newly discovered evidence 
which by due diligence could not have been discovered 
in time to move for a new trial...[or for] (3)fraud (whether 
heretofore determined intrinsic or extrinsic), 
misrepresentation or other misconduct of an adverse 
party..The motion shall be made within a reasonable 
time and for reasons (1), (2), or (3), not more than 3 
months after the judgment. 
Randee's motion might conceivably have fit under subsections 1, 25 or 3, 
but he did not bring such a motion and his Petition for Modification was not filed 
until after the three-month deadline had expired. 
In Richins v. Delbert Chipman & Sons, 817 P.2d 382 (Ut. Ct. App. 1991), 
this Court found that Rule 60(b)(1) -mistake, surprise, inadvertence or neglect-
5Although the facts show that due diligence was not exercised prior to the 
resolution of this matter. 
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applied based on the Defendant's claim that he mistakenly entered an ill-advised 
stipulation. The Defendant, however, had not filed within the three-month time 
period and attempted to set aside the judgment based on catch-all subsection of 
Rule 60(b) -" any other reason justifying the relief from the operation of the 
judgement". This section is not bound by a deadline. This Court held that since 
subsection (1) was applicable, the catch-all subsection was inapplicable and 
could not be used to overcome the failure to file within the three-month deadline. 
Here, the trial court's ruling not only relieved Randee of his burden showing 
a substantial change of circumstances but it also circumvents the deadline 
otherwise imposed by the Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Finally, if the issue of a change in circumstances was reviewed on the 
basis as proposed by the trial court in this case, one could always find a reason 
to modify a judgment. This is precisely what the Fouler Court cautioned against: 
"ad infinitum appellate review and readjustment according to the concepts of 
equity held by succeeding trial judges." Fouler, supra, 626 P.2d. at 414. 
This is particularly disturbing in light of the fact that the parties entered into 
a stipulated settlement and when Jeroldene sought to enforce that settlement, 
Randee responded by claiming that the case should be relitigated on the basis of 
Jeroldene's alleged misconduct. 
POINT II. THERE ARE NO COMPELLING REASONS TO 
RELITIGATE THE CASE. 
In Despain v. Despair), 627 P.2d 526 (Utah 1981), the Utah Supreme 
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Court addressed the issue of modification where there had been a stipulated 
agreement incorporated into the judgment. In denying the request for 
modification, the Court placed a great deal of emphasis on the fact that the 
parties entered into a stipulation: 
When a decree is based upon a property settlement 
agreement, forged by the parties and sanctioned by the 
court, equity must take such agreement into 
consideration. Equity is not available to reinstate rights 
and privileges voluntarily contracted away simply 
because one has come to regret the bargain made. 
Accordingly, the law limits the continuing jurisdiction of 
the court where a property settlement agreement has 
been incorporated into the decree, and the outright 
abrogation of the provisions of such agreement is only 
to be resorted to with great reluctance and compelling 
reasons. 
Id. 526, fn. 6. 
Randee, at the very least, was on notice of the alleged missing assets as 
addressed in his May 7,1997 letter. Even with this knowledge, Randee and his 
attorney signed the stipulation. The signing of the stipulation also took place after 
the threat was made that discovery was being drafted to compel the return of the 
records allegedly held by Jeroldene. Randee held these same concerns at that 
time and was aware of discovery methods by which more information could be 
obtained. Yet, he put these concerns aside and entered into a stipulation. Thus, 
there are no compelling reasons to reopen the case. 
In Glover v. Glover, 242 P.2d 298 (1952), the Utah Supreme Court allowed 
a property settlement to be relitigated solely on the basis that the husband had 
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engaged in active, extrinsic fraud. There, the husband had the wife quit claim her 
interest in real property with the promise that he would pay her one-half of the 
appraised value, something he had no intention of doing. The wife, relying on her 
husband's representation, did not raise that issue in the divorce settlement. The 
Utah Supreme Court reasoned that since the divorce settlement did not address 
the property in dispute, the parties were not relitigating any issues. 
This case stands in sharp contrast to Glover. There are absolutely no 
allegations that Randee was coerced or misled about the "missing" assets before 
he and/or his attorney signed the stipulation. Moreover, Randee, as his attorney 
noted in the May 7,1997-letter, had the option of compelling the discovery. 
Indeed, he indicated that the discovery was being drafted, but it was never 
pursued. Thus, the issue should be considered waived. 
In Christensen v. Christensen, 619 P 2d 1372, 1373-1374 (Utah 1980), the 
Utah Supreme Court held that a property settlement based on a stipulation could 
not be reopened and property redistributed based on the wife's claim that her ex-
husband had misrepresented the value of property that was acquired and 
maintained during the marriage and that was ultimately awarded to the husband. 
The Court simply refused to disturb a stipulated property settlement merely 
because the wife relied on information given to her by her husband in an 
adversarial proceeding. 
Here, Randee, with knowledge, voluntarily contracted his claims away in 
the divorce stipulation. The May 7, 1997 letter from Randee's counsel shows 
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knowledge of this alleged secreting of funds. Randee had the option to, but failed 
to use the discovery process. During the interlocutory period, Randee 
subpoenaed Jeroldene's banking records, but never followed up on that 
investigation. That Randee failed to diligently pursue the matter argues against 
reopening the case. 
There are no compelling reasons to relitigate this case and no change in 
circumstances has occurred that would allow a modification of the decree. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, it is respectfully requested that the trial court's 
Order denying the Motion to Dismiss Defendant's Petition to Modify be reversed. 
DATED this 8th day of October, 1998. 
UTAI^feGAL SERVICES, INC. 
By /Rosalie Reilly 
Attorney for Petitioner 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
Two copies of the foregoing Brief of Appellant were mailed, postage 
prepaid, to Defendant's attorney, Craig C. HJaffs, aJK3^ 3 South Main, Blanding, UT 
84511, this 8th day of October, 1998. 
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